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ABSTRACT 
Traditional underground utility construction and rehabilitation methods entail 
cutting open the ground which not only disrupts traffic causing delays and inconvenience, 
but also damages surface-based vegetation in some areas. Additionally, underground 
infrastructure density has been growing thereby making it more challenging to employ the 
traditional open-cut construction method. A sustainable alternative is the use of trenchless 
construction methods where underground infrastructure is installed or repaired with 
minimal surface disruption. 
Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD) is one of the popular trenchless methods for 
installing buried utility pipelines. Risk dimensionality and severity is generally greater in 
the case of HDD projects because of the fact that only limited soil and other sub-surface 
sampling will be done to choose the right type equipment, labor, materials, and drilling 
plan. Some of these risks have led to accidents on HDD projects in the past that not only 
damaged the equipment and other infrastructures, but also injured workers which proved 
fatal in some cases. In order to minimize the safety risk in HDD projects, there is an 
outstanding need for the investigation of hazards, factors and project characteristics that 
propel the probability of occurrence of accidents. 
This thesis report presents the development and demonstration of the hierarchical 
safety risk assessment framework for investigating the safety risk, especially the 
probabilities of occurrence of various hazards, of HDD projects. The developed 
“Hierarchical Risk Assessment” framework is demonstrated using two real-world HDD 
iii 
projects. The safety risk analysis performed on the two case studies highlighted the factors 
and project characteristics that aggravate the hazards and their probabilities of occurrence. 
The proposed approach for investigating safety risk on HDD projects needs to be further 
investigated and extensively evaluated on more real-world case studies before it can be 
developed into an adoptable tool for practice.  
Key Words: Horizontal Directional Drilling, Hierarchical Risk Assessment. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Underground pipeline infrastructure is must for supporting the increasing needs of 
growing population. Trenchless methods offer significant benefits over the conventional 
open-cut construction in many cases for installing buried pipelines. The conventional open-
cut method follows the cut-dig-bury-fill approach which is inconvenient to employ in high-
traffic, dense urban areas mainly due to the surface-related disruption and the resulting 
economic, environmental and societal consequences. Open-cut method can be expensive 
in cases where deeper cover is specified for the pipe or where the cost of relocating 
conflicting utilities and other surface structures is high. The significant amount of 
excavation associated with open-cut method, especially in deeper installations, also 
produce significant greenhouse gas emissions. Needless to say, they result in several 
societal consequences that include but not limited to the disruption of traffic and surface 
vegetation. Trenchless techniques are a class of underground construction methods that 
eliminate substantial digging and its associated challenges. Trenchless techniques usually 
require insignificant amount of excavation and preserves the surface-based activities.  
Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD) is a popular trenchless construction method 
that is often employed to install buried utilities. Pipelines as long as 5,000 ft and sizes of 
up to 36 inches have been reported to be installed using HDD (Duyvestyn, 2014). HDD 
offers significant environmental and societal benefits in addition to cost benefits which 




HDD technique entails three sequential steps following the pre-planning phase, namely 
pilot boring, reaming and product pipe pullback.  
Pre-planning phase: One of the primary tasks in the pre-planning phase of any HDD 
project is conducting a thorough surface and subsurface investigation in the project location 
and its surroundings to identify the constraints for a better design and construction 
planning. The sub-surface exploration includes testing of rock and soil samples for 
geologic characteristics and engineering properties. Details on existing subsurface utilities 
and soil conditions will help plan a proper drill path and choose appropriate drilling 
equipment that suits the soil conditions. Boring locations need to be subsequently planned 
considering the horizontal and vertical axis of the existing utility lines. Boring depth also 
needs to be determined so as to avoid conflicts with existing buried utilities and other 
obstacles.  
Pilot boring: A drilling equipment, called drill rig, is used in this step to drill through the 
ground and create a small diameter borehole which will be enlarged using a larger diameter 
reamer (step 2) and into which a product pipe will be pulled in (step 3) before final 
connections are made. A set of drill rods which are connected to one another to form a drill 
string is used in the pilot boring step to create the borehole. The drill string is pushed into 
the ground using the drill rig which comes in different capacities in terms of thrust force 
and torque. A drill head is attached to the beginning of the drill string to penetrate through 
the ground by cutting the soil and displacing it. The penetration of the drill string through 
the ground can be achieved either just by pushing or in some cases rotating the drill string. 




based on the real-time location monitoring during the drilling. The drill head is also 
equipped with a monitoring device that transmits information to an above surface receiver 
and the information of interest includes its horizontal and vertical location, its clock 
position among other inputs. The drill head makes a slightly larger hole than the drill string 
to create annular space for the movement of soil cuttings back to the ground with the help 
of a pressurized drilling fluid. Bentonite mixed in water is commonly used as the drilling 
fluid which helps to reduce the friction between the drill string and the borehole, cools the 
cutting head, and also stabilizes the bore hole. An operator sitting on the drill rig machine 
controls the drilling operation based on real-time data inputs on the location of the drill 
head and also based on the desired drilling path. The “pilot boring” phase ends when the 
drill string reaches the exit pit which is the other end of the desired pipeline installation. 
The illustration of the pilot boring phase of HDD Operation is presented in the Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1. A picture illustrating the pilot bore phase of HDD operation (J. D. Hair & 
Associates Inc., 2010) 
Reaming: This stage, often called back reaming, involves enlarging the drilled pilot 




and the drill string is pulled back into the bore hole in order to enlarge it for the product 
pipe to fit through. The size and type of the reamer used depends on the size of the product 
pipe and geological conditions. Pressurized drilling fluid is continuously pumped even this 
phase to push the soil cuttings out of the borehole. The reaming phase of HDD construction 
method is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Reaming phase can be avoided in soft soils for the 
installation of smaller diameter pipelines (Hair, 1994). 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Reamer (English, 2013) 
 
Figure 1.3. A picture illustrating the reaming phase of HDD operation (J. D. Hair & 




Pull Back: In this final phase of HDD construction, the product pipe is pulled through the 
enlarged bore hole; in some cases, the pull back and reaming phases are combined. In order 
to minimize the torsion on the product pipe, a swivel is used to connect the pull section to 
the leading reaming assembly. The swivel prevents the product pipe from rotating even 
when the drill string is rotated. The pipeline installation is completed when the product 
pipe is successfully pulled back to the entry point. The illustration of the pullback phase of 
HDD Operation is presented in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4. A picture illustrating the pullback phase of HDD operation (J. D. Hair & 
Associates Inc., 2010) 
Risk dimensionality and severity is generally greater in the case of HDD because 
the equipment, labor and material that is used in the process are all selected to match the 
predicted soil condition, ground water table, and location of other utilities, which are all 
determined from limited sampling done during the pre-planning phase of the projects. Any 
deviation from the predicted project parameters will escalate the risk leading to possible 
accidents. Many accidents have occurred on HDD projects due to various factors that 




inaccurate locating of existing utilities, inappropriate worker apparel, and lack of effective 
communication among crew members on the jobsite. Some of these accidents have resulted 
in severe injuries and even deaths of workers (Marktgorman, 2010). These consequences 
present a need for evaluating the safety risk on HDD projects through investigating the 
current practices in the industry. Specifically, there is a need to identify and systematically 
study various possible hazards and identify factors and specific project characteristics that 
may aggravate the safety risk resulting from the identified hazards.  
1.1 Objective of the Study:  
The objective of this study is to develop and demonstrate a “Hierarchical Risk 
Assessment” framework for evaluating safety risk of HDD projects. By understanding the 
possible factors that aggravate the probability of occurrence of various hazards and the 
specific project characteristics that support such aggravation, it is hypothesized to alleviate 
the safety risk to some degree. The proposed framework and its demonstration is expected 
to enable HDD practitioners to mitigate the safety risk associated with the humans, 
equipment and infrastructure on the job site and carry out a productive HDD project.  
1.2 Organization of the thesis: 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the 
problem associated in terms of safety risk in HDD projects. Chapter 2 presents a brief 
review of the relevant literature. Chapter 3 describes the hierarchical risk assessment 
framework. Specifically, Chapter 3 presents the identification of specific hazards, factors 




influence the safety risk. Chapter 3 also describes the survey of the influence of project 
characteristics on the factors and the factors on the hazards. Chapter 4 describes the 
demonstration of HRA methodology on two real world HDD projects and discusses the 
findings. Chapter 5 concludes this study by summarizing the findings and their implications 














CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE 
This chapter presents a brief review of relevant literature on accident causation 
theories, followed by previous safety risk analysis frameworks for construction projects in 
general and specifically for underground construction projects.  
Domino theory of accident causation hypothesizes that identifying and finding 
ways to avoid the occurrence of one key event among a series of domino events that lead 
to an accident will diminish the risk of accidents and injuries (Heinrich 1931). Human 
Factor Theory proposed that many accidents are caused due to human errors and these 
errors were subsequently identified and categorized for risk evaluation (Ferrell 1997). 
Behavior-based Safety Theory of accident causation presented a psychological aspect of 
the worker behavior in the context of accidents (Gellar 2001). Another multi-level accident 
progression model is proposed by Bird in which ignorance of one basic state leads to severe 
injuries or accident in next levels (Bird, 1969). A few of these theories played a major role 
in the development of safety risk assessment frameworks that are currently employed in 
the construction industry.  
2.1 Construction Safety Risk Assessment 
Safety risk pertaining to general construction projects has been a research topic of 
interest for several decades now and there are numerous frameworks and standards that 
multiple construction companies currently follow. Some of these frameworks and 




There are many guidelines that were set internationally to enhance safety of 
construction projects.  
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), as part of the United 
States Department of Labor, published guidelines that provide information on rule-making 
process to improve the health and safety in the work place. OSHA also provides training, 
outreach, education and assistance activities on their standards to the work force so that 
they can be employed as required. Their standards are readily available online for anyone 
to adopt. Although the regulations are numerous, almost all of them reflect the general 
common sense, best practices, and includes examples on what experienced and prudent 
employees would do in their jobs to maintain a risk-free work place. Limitation of those 
regulations is that it does not provide quantitative assessment of risk aversion associated 
with each standard.  
National institute of safety and health (NIOSH), established under Occupational 
health and Safety Act 1970, conducts research on workers wellbeing and spreads guidelines 
through manuals on work safety and measures to maintain good health of workers. NIOSH 
facilitates high-risk industrial sectors in proving innovative solutions for difficult-to-solve 
problems. This source helps in critical analysis of qualitative risk characterization and helps 
in management of occupational hazards.   
Rand (1955) developed the Delphi method to calculate the impact of technology on 
modern world. The method involves a group of experts who reply to questionnaires related 




"group response." Which help in quantifying uncertainty and draw a conclusion on an 
opinion. Later Delphi based risk analysis was developed on the same basis to evaluate the 
safety risk of construction operations where no quantitative data is available. This method 
is a time consuming process and effectiveness of the work depends of the expert decision 
whose perceptions may change relative to the future research on that specific topic. 
Consequently, it is preferred to be used only where quantitative models are difficult to use. 
Zadeh (1965) established the Fuzzy Set Theory to find a way of dealing with risk 
due to hazards where the source of information related to risk is absent. The risk factors 
are divided into sets. Fuzziness indicate the uncertainty in happening of a hazard which is 
often expressed in linguistic terms such as high, medium, and low. These terms are further 
converted into quantitative numbers by use of membership functions through which 
severity is calculated by various statistical procedures. This model proves its importance 
where typical mathematical models lack evidence for problem solving in complex 
phenomenon, and it consumes very less time for producing the results. The limitation is 
the lack of mathematical evidence for the obtained findings.  
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Wang 1977) is one popular method which 
helps in determining the relative importance of different attributes that causes risk by expert 
evaluation in three steps: (1) work breakdown structure on risks due to specific events, (2) 
compare and set priorities between structures by expert decisions, and (3) hierarchical 
arrangement of priorities. Based on the expert decisions, a weightage index system is 
established where the consistency between the factors causing risk is tested. This process 




lack of necessary data required for risk assessment. The main advantage of AHP is its 
ability to check and decrease the inconsistency of expert findings. This research employs 
a methodology similar to AHP to evaluate the relative importance of factors that aggravate 
the occurrence of hazards and characteristics that affect factors leading to a hazard. 
Limitations of AHP method are that sometimes problems arise due to interdependence 
between criteria and alternatives which can lead to inconsistencies between judgment and 
ranking criteria. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been used for the evaluation of safety risk in 
construction projects (Suresh et al., 2003). In this approach, accidents are categorized into 
ground, machines, environment and management. FTA involves identifying the risk factors 
encountered by construction industry by collecting information on different construction 
risks and their consequences. Alternatives were developed to prevent or mitigate the risk 
effects. Experts with in-depth knowledge of construction projects can provide a valuable 
opinion on uncertainties. The advantage of this method is it takes less time to develop.  
Construction Job Safety Analysis (CJSA) (Rozenfeld, 2006), a lean approach was 
developed to manage safety in the construction industry. Safety Analysis can be performed 
in three steps: (1) Identification of hazards and analysis of loss of control events that may 
aggravate, (2) Evaluation of probability of occurrence of the analyzed loss of control 
events, and (3) Finding the expected degree of severity caused due to possible loss-of-
control events with possible accident scenarios. The advantage of this method is that 
relative quantitative measures for each event are obtained, but the risk reduction or the 




Mitropoulos (2009) recently presented the Task Demand Methodology which 
relates productivity and safety of construction projects at the same time using basic 
construction operation parameters. This method is demonstrated in 4 steps: (1) Identifying 
the two key factors responsible for assessing the likelihood of accidents, (2) Determination 
of the exposure time on hazard, (Based on live observations and interviews), (3) 
Determining the factors affecting task demand during the exposure, which basically 
indicates that there will a probability of accident upon exposure to hazard, finally (4) 
Calculating the safety risk of the operation i.e. exposure times the task demand. The 
limitations of this method being it can only be used to compare the safety risk for same 
hazard under different operational parameters but cannot be used to compare different 
hazards. Other disadvantage is it does not correlate the task demand values with probability 
of incidents. 
2.2 Safety Risk Assessment of Underground Utility Construction Projects 
Several researchers conducted studies on deriving frameworks specifically for 
underground construction utility projects using general construction risk evaluation 
methods, depending on the extent of available data and job site conditions. A few previous 
studies are briefly reviewed in the following paragraphs.  
Ariaratnam (2007) presented the Total Risk Index Model (TRI) which is used for 
calculating the risk value for underground urban utility projects. This model calculates the 
risk involved in the HDD and the Open Cut (OC) excavation for a specific project in two 
steps using four sub-indices namely contingency plans, determining bid price, eco-social 




choices that pertains to a specific project. Users and the industry specialists are invited to 
participate in the questionnaire survey by choosing one option as their opinion. Risk Index 
is calculated using the answers obtained from the survey for each sub index using Eq. 1. 
RIHDD or OC = f {EI / MI}                                                 (1) 
Where RI = Risk Index; HDD = Horizontal Directional Drilling; OC = Open Cut; 
EI = Estimated Index (answers obtained from users); MI = Maximum Index (answers 
obtained from industry specialists); 
In the next step, each sub-index is given equal weighted sub index value which is 
independent of the number of questions created for each sub index. After calculating all 
the sub index values, Total Risk Index (TRI) is calculated using Eq. 2. 
TRIHDD or OC = f {(∑ (RI sub index)) / 4}                                    (2) 
Where TRI = Total Risk Index; HDD = Horizontal Directional Drilling; OC = 
Open Cut; RI = Risk Index (obtained from equation 1.).  
TRI value is calculated both for HDD and OC methods from the values obtained 
from the questionnaire. Smallest TRI value obtained method is chosen for the construction. 
Advantages of this model is it takes less time, compares two methods and gives feasible 
solution from four perspectives ( addressed as sub-indices in the model). Disadvantage is 
that the choice of method is dependent all alone on the questionnaire results (which may 




A framework using Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Method (FCEM) and 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was developed by Ma et al. (2010) for quantifying the 
risk of Maxi HDD projects. The methodology entails: (1) Identifying and classifying the 
risks in each level of HDD operation, (2) Finding weight value of each associated risk from 
structured matrices judgement matrices, membership matrices, and index systems using 
maximum membership functions and MATLAB software. The Total risk value for the 
entire project is obtained by combining all the values in each level risk classifications. 
Advantages are Risk management decisions can be made easily. FCEM is mainly used in 
the place of complicated projects as risk values can be easily derived using subjective 
judgements. Disadvantages are they provide only theoretical bases for risk evaluation but 
not mathematical evidence.  
Gierczak (2014) proposed a model for evaluating the safety risk of Mini, Mid, Maxi 
HDD projects using Fuzzy Fault tree Analysis (FFTA). The research focuses on two main 
aspects namely: (1) Development of mathematical model and, (2) Development of risk 
management strategy. The first aspect is demonstrated in eight steps (1) Defining the 
analysis of scope of the work, (2) Gathering information, (3) Hazard identification, (4) 
Construction of Fault Tree (FT), qualitative analysis of fault tree, (6) Quantitative risk 
assessment applying using of trapezoidal member ship functions fuzzy arithmetic followed 
by defuzzification using center of area method (Filev 1994) (7) Managing the assessed risk, 
(8) Decision making. The advantages of this method are it can be used on any type of 
construction practice. It gives a broad knowledge on failure mechanisms and reduces 




assessment for the trenchless pipe installation of various sizes; but the model includes 
complex calculations which take lot of time.  
Choi (2015) developed a methodology named Risk Assessment Methodology for 
underground construction projects. This methodology consists of three main steps to arrive 
at obtaining the value of risk namely: (1) Identifying factors causing risk (2) Analyzing 
those factors (3) Evaluating the risk. The tools used in this study are survey sheets (to be 
filled by experts), detailed check sheets for risk identification, and a risk analysis software 
based on Fuzzy concept basically coded for subway projects. This software comprises of 
three modules: (1) Data input module (Data is input from the subjective judgements or 
probabilistic parameter estimates, (2) Probabilistic Analysis module, (3) Output Module 
(gives the risk value). The methodology is easy to use as data can be used either from 
subjective judgements, observations or historic data. But the disadvantage being the 
software is framed only for subway construction projects. So certain modifications are 
necessary to use the project for other underground construction practices. 
2.3 Overview of Safety Risk Assessment Frameworks 
Table 2.1 presents advantages and limitations of various commonly-used safety risk 







Table 2.1: Commonly used safety risk evaluation methods in the construction Industry 
(Cont. in Table 2.2) 




The Domino Theory 
1. Indicates that the accident is the 
result of a single root cause. 
 
 
2. This is a Simple process, and 
considers only a single chain of 
factors ( 5 factors) 
 
1. Does not account or consider 
effective analysis of 
environmental factors. 
 
2. Do not provide any data on 






The Delphi Method 










3.Prevents direct communication of 
experts with one another ( avoids peer 
pressure and extrinsic pressure) 
 
1. Drop outs in response rates 
of the experts may result in 
inconvenience of the survey. 
 
2. Time delays may occur in the 
process in data collection 
process from the experts such 






Total Risk Index 
Model  
1. Consumes less quality time  
 
 
2. Compares two methods of 
underground constructions and gives 
feasible solution from four 
perspectives 1. A contingency plans 2. 
Determining bid price 3. Eco-social 
factors 4. Consideration factors. 
 
3. Although the method is proposed 
for underground projects, its 
simplicity makes it useful to other 
general construction projects.  
1. Experts are the only source 
for the determination of TRI. 
 
2. Effectiveness depends all 








Table 2.2. Commonly used safety risk evaluation methods in the construction Industry 





Fault Tree Analysis 
1. Can be applied to analyze risk for 
which there is a lack of sufficient data 
and incomplete knowledge. 
 
2. It involves the cause-and-effect 
relationship between key factors and 
the exposure for each individual risk. 
 
3. Key risks can be identified and 
managed quiet quickly. 
 
1. Difficulty in developing in 
the member ship functions  
 
 










1. This method measures safety and 





2. This method provides researchers 
and practitioners a tool for analyzing 
the accident potential under different 
operational parameters and identifies 
how changes in the operation affect 
the accident potential scenarios under 
one single hazard. 
 
3. This will allow to design more safer 
and productive operations. 
1. This method focuses on 
emotionally disturbing injuries 
and does not capture the risks 
arising from overexertion 
injuries, physical fatigue. 
 








3. Does not correlate the task 
demand values with probability 
of incidents. 
 
4. The presence of multiple 
hazards may also increase the 
likelihood of incidents, as the 







2.4 Chapter Summary 
In summary, although previous studies which were discussed in this chapter 
introduced many risk evaluation frameworks, only few presented easy-to-use, quick 
approaches for reliable risk assessment of underground construction projects, especially 
HDD projects. This thesis study proposed and demonstrated a hierarchical safety risk 
assessment approach which when further evaluated and improved could serve in 














CHAPTER 3: HIRARCHIAL RISK ASSESMENT 
METHODOLOGY 
Safety risk in the context of this thesis is characterized as the probability of a person 
getting injured or equipment getting damaged during a Horizontal Directional Drilling 
(HDD) project. A Hierarchical Risk Assessment (HRA) approach is proposed for assessing 
the probability occurrence of hazards in HDD projects. Specific hazards, critical factors 
that aggravate or alleviate the hazards, and various project characteristics form the 
hierarchies of the HRA approach.  
3.1 Hazard Identification: 
            Hazard in this study refers to the threat of injury or death to workers, damage to 
construction equipment or any infrastructure. HDD projects are typically completed in 
three sequential construction phases namely, pilot bore, reaming, and pull back. It has its 
share of hazards in all the three phases that must be controlled or eliminated in order to 
ensure worker and public safety (Kennedy, 2010). Several possible hazards are identified 
in Figure 3.1 for each of these three phases by gathering information from various previous 





Figure 3.1. Hazards  
3.2 Critical HDD hazard identification: 
Among the several hazards listed in Figure 3.1, four critical hazards have been 
chosen upon survey of literature and reviewing various case studies on accidents occurred 
on previous HDD projects. The four critical hazards are “Hitting other utilities,” 
“Stall/breakage of drill string / drill head,” “Injury to workers,” and “Workers falling into 
excavated pits.” These four hazards are briefly described along with accounts of accident 
histories that stand as examples of these hazards being realized.  
H1 - Hitting other utilities: 
“Hitting other utilities” is one of the possible hazards that could occur during the 
pilot bore phase of any HDD project. This hazard is realized when the drill head 
accidentally hits other utilities potentially resulting in several complications that include 




to workers on the jobsite depending on what type of utility line is hit. For example, hitting 
a sewer line may not be as consequential as hitting a gas or electric line. This hazard may 
occur due to lack of details on depth and position of existing utility lines. The probability 
of occurrence of this hazard is determined to be dependent on various factors which in turn 
are dependent on various project characteristics. 
The factors that influence the hazard “Hitting other utilities” are identified through 
survey of literature and synthesis of past accidents on HDD projects. The three major 
factors which are determined to influence “Hit other utilities” hazard in HDD projects are:  
F1 - Experience of the worker on job site:  
In any boring operation, the project success is mainly dependent on the operator 
who is controlling the boring/drilling equipment. In such a case, the skill level the operator 
possesses would play an important role in successfully completing the drilling operation. 
In the presence of one or more utility lines, there is a good possibility for the contractor on 
lacking details on the vertical elevation in some cases, though the location of existing 
utilities is known through sub-surface utility investigation. During such conditions the 
contractor has to deal carefully to plan the drill above or below the utility line.  This is more 
likely possible through experience in handling such situations. Lack of spontaneity, another 
experiential attribute, on such situations may result in hitting other utilities.  
F2 - Accuracy of sub-surface utility Engineering (SUE):  
It is very important to have accurate SUE data which can be achieved, for example 




studies, literature review and in person observation of the boring operation, it is understood 
that “Hitting other utilities” may occur due to the lack of accurate SUE data and therefore 
this factor is identified as one of the critical factors for this hazard. 
F3 - Inappropriate/Lack of a communication mechanism among the crew:  
Inappropriate communication or lack of a communication mechanism enabled 
through Walkie-talkies, Radios, or Walk-over systems influence the safety risk of a HDD 
operation. Any deviations in the drill path as noted by the walkover system or any other 
issues arising on the jobsite need to be notified to the drill rig operator in a timely manner 
for the safety of people, equipment and infrastructure.  
The following real-world examples describe the circumstances and the 
consequences of accidents where other utility lines were hit during a HDD project due to 
lack of communication among the crew and thorough details on exiting utilities, and so 
these factors were identified as critical factors for the Hazard “ Hitting other utilities.” 
i. The gas explosion occurred in St. Paul, Minneapolis at Arden Avenue in Edina, 
which was due to a gas leak that eventually sparked the explosion when cable crews 
using directional drilling equipment ruptured a gas line. The consequences of this 
accident include the demolition of two houses near 5000 Arden Ave. in Edina 
(Nelson, 2010). 
ii. In 1997, Datong No. 1 Coal Mine and Shihao Coal Mine in china used two units of 
LHD-75 Directional Drill System for gas drainage. The experiment was dropped 




damaged during transportation and also the geology problems which were not 
detected in the sub surface investigation. The results are leaving sticking problems 
up to the bore depth of 45 m and 75 m in Datong No. 1 Coal Mine and Shihao Coal 
Mine, respectively. (Lu, 2011) 
H2 - Stall/breakage of drill string/drill head:  
This is considered one of the critical hazards that could possibly occur in any HDD 
project if safe design and drilling procedures are not given priority. Stall/breakage of the 
drilling tools might occur due to lack of proper geotechnical data or usage of aged tools 
which are no longer able to support the designed operation. There is a good possibility of 
this hazard occurring due to excess use of torque and drag by the operator than necessary. 
This hazard results in the breakage of the drill string thereby halting the drilling operation 
before the drilling tools are restored and operation reinitiated. Sometimes, the stalling of 
drill string may even topple the drill rig and injure the operator.  
Three critical factors were identified to be influencing the probability of occurrence 
of this hazard. They are: 
F1 - Experience of the worker on job site:  
Any drilling operation is influenced by the person operating the primary equipment 
which is the HDD drill rig in this case. Maintenance of thrust and torque loads within the 
safe limits of the particular drill rig by keeping in mind the uncertainties with respect to the 
geological conditions of the ground is a responsibility of the drill rig operator that is 




on the drill rig in a given soil condition may lead to “Stall/breakage of drill string/drill 
head” and may even lead to the collapse of the drill rig (Boomana, et al., 2013). 
F4 - Age of the tool used for the HDD operation:  
Aged tools such as the drill string, drill head that are used in any HDD operation 
may no longer be able to handle the design loading when operating in tough sub-surface 
geology. In such cases, “Stall/ breakage of drill string/ drill head” is possible.  
F5 - Exceeding the force limits of the drill rig:  
Pipe movements such as drilling ahead or tripping create drag, while rotation 
produces torque (Ruiz, 2014); the normal contact force between pipe and the borehole wall 
is influenced by these force limits. Exceeding the limits of these forces may break the 
equipment and subsequently result in the stalling of the drill string. The consequence 
resulting in this factor occurrence were undesirable as observed in the past HDD projects, 
and so it is considered as one of the factors responsible for the hazard “Stall/breakage of 
drill string/drill head.” The force limits and the rotational capacity are equally important as 
other factors, for they may equally influence the safety risk. Lack of frequent monitoring 
of the values may lead to “Stall/breakage of drill string/drill head.” There are few scenarios 
where this hazard has been realized (Ugrich, 2007) 
H3 - Injury to worker:  
This is identified as one of the critical hazards in HDD projects as evidenced by its 




machinery attacks or unforeseen conditions in addition to the workers being careless – e.g., 
moving in close proximity to working equipment, inattentive to the commination systems 
among the crew or due to the machinery attacks on the crew like the drill string hitting the 
workers while it exits the borehole. Even collapse of equipment due to unforeseen 
conditions may also happen due to natural hazards or human mistakes which lead to death 
or major injury to workers. 
Three critical factors were determined to be influencing the probability of 
occurrence of this hazard and are briefly described in the following paragraphs: 
F1 - Experience of the worker on job site: 
Construction workers constantly need to adapt to the changing work environments, 
and their attentiveness and general cognizance of the work environment influences their 
ability to be safe on the jobsite (Canadian Centre for Occupational Health & Safety, 2016). 
Although workers are trained to safely execute their specific tasks, their general response 
and attention to activities on the jobsite – a trait expected to grow on with experience – 
influence the safety risk.   
F6 - Lack of PPE:  
Personal protective equipment (PPE) is of utmost importance in any construction 
activity no matter what the activity is. Many incidents in the past proved how useful PPE 
is for mitigating accidents when hazard-related uncertainties arise. Consequently, “Lack of 
PPE” is identified as a critical factor that affects the ability of a worker to be protected from 




F7 - Unsuitable apparel for the work conditions:  
Material, color and type of the apparel used for a HDD operation influence the 
safety risk of the operation. This has been found to be a crucial factor based on a few past 
accidents on HDD job sites.  
 The following is an example of a past project where this hazard occurred: 
i. A worker got injured in Alberta, Canada on September 19th 2009, during a HDD 
operation. The worker got injured as a result of equipment failure in the middle of 
a culvert-drilling project under a highway. The injury turned out to be fatal leading 
to the death of the worker. The officials said that HDD operation is unusual practice 
for that kind of a project. (Canada News, 2009). 
H4 - Workers falling into excavated Pits:  
This could happen on a HDD job site due to the carelessness of workers in addition 
to several other factors such as lack of safe working conditions. The previous hazard related 
to worker injuries is only due to machinery and not workers carelessness. The consequence 
of the current hazard is that the workers could fall into entry or exit pits, or creeks and other 
large water bodies across which a pipeline is being installed using HDD due to inattentive 
behavior of the worker in reacting to the job site conditions.  
Four critical factors were determined to be influencing the probability of occurrence 





F1 - Experience of the worker on job site:  
Like any other hazard, the safety risk of “Workers falling into excavated pits” is 
also expected to be strongly influenced by the “Experience of the worker on job site”. 
F3 - Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the crew:  
Inappropriate real-time communication and lack of adequate training may also lead 
to Workers falling into excavated pits, and it is therefore identified as a critical factor.  
F8 - Lack of proper barricading around the pits and alarms:  
Safety on the job site is maintained by following a few minimum safety regulations. 
It is identified from the review of a few past projects that lack of proper barricading around 
the excavated pits and alarms influence the safety risk of a HDD operation.  
F9 - Behavior and postures of the workers during the drilling operation:  
The posture of workers on HDD projects, especially when they are pushed to be 
more productive, could become unsafe and may lead to them falling into pits or trenches. 
OSHA and the United States Department of Labor have set some guidelines to avoid 
accidents in such job site conditions. 
The following is an example of a past HDD project where this hazard occurred: 
i. During the mid-spring of 2008, a crew was using a Horizontal Directional Drilling 
(HDD) machine to install a water line along a rural Iowa roadway. After completion 
of the pilot bore phase, the worker who was 600ft away from the drill rig operator 




rod. Before the worker set his position away from the rig, the drill rig operator 
started back-reaming operation. When the drill rig operator was asking the worker 
at the exit side for the reamers progress, he apparently discovered the victim’s body 
wrapped around the drill line in the area of the pre-cutter just ahead of the back 
reamer (University of IOWA, 2008). 
3.3 HDD Project Characteristics that influence safety risk 
While the hazards and factors identified hitherto are generic in nature, they are 
influenced by the specific characteristics of any HDD project. Characteristics are tied to 
the factors in the hierarchical risk assessment methodology. Several characteristics for each 
factor are identified in the following: 
F1 - Experience of the drilling contractor. 
C1 - Less than 3 years 
C2 - 3 to 7 years 
C3 - 7 to 10 years 
C4 - More than 15 years 
F2 - Accuracy of Sub surface Utility Engineering (SUE). 
C1 – Quality Level D (per ASCE 38-02): Information collected from existing records or 




C2 – Quality Level C (per ASCE 38-02): Information gathered from surveying and by 
plotting utility features existing above ground/Use of professional judgement in correlating 
this information to quality level D 
C3 – Quality level B (per ASCE 38-02): Information obtained by application of surface 
geophysical methods to determine the existence and approximate positioning of utilities in 
horizontal direction 
C4 – Quality level A (per ASCE 38-02): Information regarding the horizontal and vertical 
location of utilities through actual exposure and measurement of subsurface utilities 
generally at a specific point 
F3 - Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the crew. 
C1 – Low Quality walk over system due to which obstacles where physical walk over is 
difficult 
C2 – High Quality of the walk over system operated by skilled labor  
C3 – Interference with the magnetic fields from the underground buried power lines due 
to quality of walk over system  
C4 – A non-skilled locator operating a high quality walk over system/Improper Basics of 
reading and interpreting the signals.  
F4 - Age of the tool used for the HDD operation. 
 C1 - More than 10 years 




C3 - 3 to 7 years 
C4 - Less than 3 years 
F5 - Exceeding the force limits of the drill rig. 
C1 - Inexperienced operator performing the boring operation in maintaining the limits of 
buffer capacity of the drill rig  
C2 - Experienced operator performing the boring operation in maintaining the limits of 
buffer capacity of the drill rig  
C3 - Machinery problem. 
F6 - Lack of PPE. 
C1 - Lack of certain PPE availability on site to replace the damaged ones. 
C2 - Unsuitability of the available PPE for that particular operation. 
F7 - Unsuitable apparel for the work conditions. 
C1 - Improper clothing of the worker whether it is material or type (wet/dry) 
C2 - Attention to each other among the crew on the job site due to lack of high visibility 
clothing   
F8 - Lack of proper barricading around the excavated pits and alarms. 
C1 - Lack of Backfill/Adequate barrier around temporary wells, pits, shafts, etc.  




F9 - Behavior and posture of the worker in the job conditions. 
C1 - Mental Stability of the worker. 
C2 - Physical Stability of the worker 
C3 - Level of training of the worker received and experience of the worker. 
3.4 Description of the Hierarchical Risk Assessment Methodology 
In this pursuit, attributes influencing each hazard are known from a limited number 
of case studies, but there is dearth of quantitative data to develop relationship functions 
between the hazards and the influential factors. 
A tree diagram presented in the Figure 3.2 represents the hierarchy of the hazards, 
influential factors and the project characteristics considered for the generation of 










A very minimum historic data is available on the factors and hazards used for this 
framework. In order to address this limitation a pair wise comparative questionnaire survey 
is prepared with five qualitative answer choices for each question. An example question in 
this survey is: 
Q) Relative to the factor “wrongly marked utilities,” how significantly will the factor 
“experience of the operator performing the boring operation” contribute to the occurrence 
of “hit other utility” hazard? 
(a) Very high 
(b) Somewhat high 
(c) Equal 
(d) Somewhat Low 
(e) Very Low 
The complete questionnaire survey for understanding the influence of factors on 
the hazards is included in Appendix A. A similar questionnaire was used for the 
determining the relative influence of characteristics on the factors. 
Experts having similar level of experience with HDD projects are invited to answer 
the questionnaire by choosing one option as their choice for each question. Their responses 
are later converted into quantitative numbers by use of the rating chart shown in Table 3.1.  
Based on the experts’ responses and their subsequent conversion to quantitative 
ratings as per Table 3.1, relative influential measures (in percentages) of various factors on 
the hazards and similarly various characteristics on each factor (refer to the hierarchy in 




comparison judgments and the resulting priority vector (Rangone, 1996; Saaty, 2003). 
Such pair-wise judgments are helpful where no quantitative data is available, which is the 
case in the risk assessment framework proposed in this study. 
Table 3.1. Rating Chart for Quantifying Questionnaire Responses 
Qualitative Terms Ratings 
Very high 3 
Somewhat high 2 
Equal 1 
Somewhat Low 1/2 
Very Low 1/3 
 
For a given HDD Project, considering the job site details, crew details, durations, 
safety details, equipment details, the probability of occurrence of the hazard are estimated 
from the relative influence of factors on respective hazards and relative influence of 
characteristics on respective factors. The percentage influence values, i.e. the priority 
vector (Saaty, 2003), are derived from the questionnaire responses, as illustrated in Tables 
3.2 and 3.3 for the influence of F1, F2 and F3 on H1. Table 3.4 presents the priority vector 




Table 3.2. Expert responses (quantitative) for the influence of factors F1, F2 and F3 on H1 
hazard 
 Hazard – 1 (H1) 
 F12 F23 F13 
E1 1 0.5 3 
E2 0.5 0.3 3 
E3 1 3 0.3 
E4 0.5 3 3 
E5 0.3 2 2 
Avg. (E1:E5) 0.66 1.76 2.26 
 
In Table 3.2,  
E = Expert 
F12 = Influence of F1 on H1 compared to F2; F21 = 1/F12 
F23 = Influence of F2 on H1 compared to F3; F32 = 1/F23 
F13 = Influence of F1 on H1 compared to F3; F31 = 1/F13 
Avg. (E1:E5) = Average of all the responses 






The priority vector is calculated by taking average of each row in Table 3.4.  
Factors  F1 F2 F3 
F1 1 0.66 2.26 
F2 1.51 1 1.76 
F3 0.44 0.56 1 




Table 3.4. Priority vector calculation (part 2) 
Factors F1 F2 F3 Priority Vector 
F1 1/2.95 0.66/2.26 2.26/5.02 0.3616 
F2 1.51/2.95 1/2.26 1.76/5.02 0.4375 
F3 0.44/2.95 0.56/2.26 1/5.02 0.2007 
 
Similarly, Priority Vectors are calculated to represent the influence of respective 
factors on other hazards, and the influence of project characteristics on the factors. 
Summarized survey responses that are used in performing the calculations of Priority 
Vectors are included in Appendix B. The hierarchical illustration presented in Figure 3.3 
shows the estimated influence of various characteristics on the factors and similarly the 
influence of factors on the hazards.  
The probability of occurrence (PO) of a hazard can be calculated using Eq. 3. 
                                         PO of any Hazard, 𝐻𝑖 =  ∑ (𝐹𝑎𝑖 ×  𝐶𝐹𝑎)𝑎𝑖                                 (3) 
Where H = Hazard;   
i = Index of a given hazard; 
a = Index of the specific factor that influences hazard i; 
𝐹𝑎𝑖 = Priority vector value of the respective factor Fa that influences hazard i; 









CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This Chapter presents the description of two mini HDD projects and the findings 
from the demonstration of the HRA framework on them.  
4.1 Case Study 1: Anderson, SC. 
This construction project entails installing a 2” high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
water service line using horizontal directional drilling (HDD) method. The water service 
line connects the water main to a residential dwelling in Anderson, SC through a recently 
installed water meter. The dwelling is located at a significant higher elevation compared to 
the water meter and the average depth of installation is about 6ft. This case study analyzes 
only the pilot hole drilling part of this HDD project. All the data was recorded in person 
on the day of drilling which was 10th February of 2016.  
Construction Operational Planning 
The contractor chose to use a Mini HDD drill rig for this project to install the 2” 
HDPE pipeline through lean clay of low plasticity (i.e., CL type as per USCS 
classification). The contractor employed a two-person crew for this job with one operating 
the drill rig (hereafter referred as crew member A) and other locating the drill head and 
monitoring the drill path (hereafter referred as crew member B). It should be noted that the 
weather was not very supportive on the day of drilling with a recorded temperature of -40 
C (or ≈ 250 F). The construction equipment and materials on the project site includes a D 
9x13 S3 Navigator Horizontal Directional Drill Rig, a fluid tank, drilling fluid, a manually-




The drill rig used in this project, which is shown in Figure 4.1, has rated capacities of 
13,000 ft-lb rotational torque and 9,000 lbs. of thrust and pull back forces. The fluid mixing 
tank, which is shown in Figure 4.2, has a capacity of 500 gallons. The 2” HDPE pipe spool, 
which is depicted in Figure 4.3, is of Schedule 40 type. The site layout is depicted in Figure 
4.4.  
 















   
 
Figure 4.4. Project Site Layout. 
Construction Challenges 
The reason for including this case study in this thesis despite the fact that it covers 
only the pilot-hole drilling phase of the project is because of the unique challenges it 
presented in terms of existing subsurface utilities and jobsite landscape. There were four 
existing utility lines in the direction of the drill path which were marked by the respective 
utility departments prior to drilling; these include a gas line (marked in yellow, as shown 




communications line (marked in orange, as shown in Figure 4.5), and a power line (marked 
in red, as shown in Figure 4.6).  
 
Figure 4.5. Water, gas and communications utility markings on the project sire (White 






Figure 4.6. Electric utility marking on the project site 
While the gas, communications and water lines did not prove to be conflicting with 
the proposed drill path, the power line which also crosses the creek from beneath posed a 
major conflict that resulted in re-initiating the drilling activity six times before it went 
smoothly. The challenge was to set the angle of entry for the pilot bore in such a way that 
the drill string maintains a safe distance from the power line (above or below) and at the 
same time stays at a safe depth beneath the creek and not hit the creek wall which is made 
up of rocks. As can be observed from the illustration presented in Figure 4.7, the drill path 
either had to be over the power line and under the rocks or much deeper than the power 
line and the rocks. Drilling at greater depths is not an option as the drilling radius is 
constrained by the equipment, and the dwelling to which a water line connection is being 




Figure 4.7. Illustration of the construction challenge associated with drilling under the 
creek wall and above the power line 
Another factor that exacerbated this challenge is the fact the there is no data 
available on the depth of the power line. Due to lack of data on the depth of the power line, 
the project crew had to employ a reasonably risky approach of trial and error with the 
objective of going over the power line and underneath the creek wall. To minimize the risk 
of hitting the power line, the crew had to constantly stop and evaluate the possibility of 
closer proximity to the power line by attempting to even expose the power line at times, as 





Figure 4.8. Crew members trying to expose the power line while the drilling is 
suspended 
Due to the perceived risk, the crew decided to change the position and orientation 
(i.e., angle of entry) of the drill rig six times before they were able to overcome the hurdle 
of safely crossing the power line and the creek. In a few earlier attempts, the operator drilled 
through the soil up until the location of the power line and then the drilling had to be 
abandoned for the fear of close proximity in depth to the power line. In other earlier 




power line but couldn’t get the drill string to a desired depth underneath the creek. The 
position and/or orientation of the drill rig had changed in each of the six attempts.   
During the multiple failed attempts to safely navigate the subsurface and other 
constraints, some unsafe behavior, especially of crew member B, was observed. In an 
attempt to be efficient, the crew member B had leaned on to a tree dangerously closer to 






Figure 4.9. A picture showing the crew member B hanging on to a tree closer to the 
creek 
Although there were no accidents on this job, crew member B could have slipped 
or lost support from the tree branch he was hanging on to and may have fallen into the 
creek. This observation clearly relates to the Hazard 4 – Workers falling into pits as a result 
of their behaviors and postures –discussed in Chapter 3 as part of the Hierarchal Risk 
Assessment methodology. In such situations, the crew member could have used a more 




have also been better with safety risks such as this eliminated with better work organization 
and planning.  
Contamination of creek water from the intrusion of drilling fluid was also observed 
in some of the failed attempts to drill underneath the creek. The drill head had pierced 
through the rocks at the surface level and as a result the drilling fluid mixed with the 
excavated soil is released into the creek water, as can be observed from Figure 4.10. The 
inadvertent release of drilling fluid into a water body is a major environmental concern 
(Ariaratnam et al., 2007) due to the effects of the drilling fluid additives and soil on the 
aquatic life in these water bodies. The operating crew could have easily avoided this by 






Figure 4.10. Inadvertent drilling fluid returns to the creek 
Data Collection 
The data necessary for performing the safety risk analysis of this HDD job was 
collected through personal observation and also through a brief interview of the drill rig 
operator who seemed to be the superintendent on the jobsite. The collected data is presented 








Table 4.1. Job Site Details 
Parameters Data Input 
Location of the Job site Anderson, SC 
Date 2/10/2016 
Season and weather conditions Spring, -40 C (or ≈ 250 F). 
Work timings 10:00 AM -  
Length of the Bore hole 200 ft. 
Depth of Installation 6 ft. (average) 
Soil conditions Low plasticity, Lean clay (CL) 
Obstacles along the bore hole One water body 
Utility lines located in the surroundings Gas, communications, power and water 
lines 
Level of accuracy of SUE Level 2  
Number of excavated pits 2 ( Entry pit, Exit pit) 
Traffic around the work site No traffic 
   
Table 4.2. Crew Details 
Parameters Data Input 
Number of workers at Entry pit 1 
Number of workers at Exit pit 1 
Position of the crew Person A at the drill rig, person B 
monitoring the drill head 
 
Table 4.3. Durations 
Parameters Data Input 
Pilot bore phase 10:00 To ……. 
Reaming phase N/A 










Table 4.4. Equipment Details 
Parameters Data Input  
Type and Diameter of the pipe 2” HDPE Pipe 
Amount of fluid used for operation 500 Gallons 
Drill fluid return timings No returns 
Torque 13,000 ft-lb. 
Pull back 9,000 lbs. 
Type of Communication System Walk over system 
Angle of the drill rig at the entrance 200 
Age of the tools used in the operation 3 Years 
 
Table 4.5. Safety Details 
Parameters Data Input 
PPE of the Labor Leather clothing, Shoes, Hat 
Type of barricading around the job site N/A 
Unsafe behavior and posters of the 
workers 
One ( Hanging to the branches of the tree 
) 
Safety Regulations followed by the crew None 
Color of clothing N/A 
Material of the Clothing Leather as it is cold 





Based on the data collected for the pilot-hole phase of this mini HDD project, safety 
risk is estimated using the Hierarchical Safety Risk Assessment approach described in 
Chapter 3. Characteristics are chosen for each factor based on the data from Tables 4.1 
through 4.5 and presented in Table 4.6. The relative percentage preferences of the 
characteristics in terms of their safety attributes, which are derived from a survey of HDD 





Table 4.6. Characteristics and Corresponding Percentage Scores for each Factor 
Factor Characteristic Weightage  
F1 - Experience of the 
operator performing the 
boring operation 
C4  - More than 10 years  16.36% 
F2  - Accuracy of SUE C4 - Quality level B (per ASCE 38-02): 
Information obtained by application of 
surface geophysical methods to determine 
the existence and approximate positioning 
of utilities in horizontal direction. 
 
25.96% 
F3 - Failure in 
Communication mechanism 
C2 - Good quality walk over system 
operated by the skilled labor 
21.52% 
F4 - Age of the tools used 
for the operation 
C2 – 3 to 7 years 24.05% 
F5  -  Increased Torque/drag/ 
Rotational Speed of the drill 
rig 
C1 - Experience of the operator 
performing the boring operation in 
maintaining the limits of buffer capacity 
of the drill rig 
25.54% 
F6  - Lack of PPE C1 –  Unsuitable material / Color of the 
clothing 
43.30% 
F7 - Unsuitable apparel for 
the work conditions 
C2 - Attention towards the worker on the 
job site due to lack of High visibility 
Clothing 
47.61% 
F8 - Lack of Proper 
barricading around the 
excavated pits 
C1 - Lack of Backfill / Adequate barrier 
around temporary wells, pits, shafts, etc. 
50.78% 
F9 – Behavior and Posture 
of the workers 
C3 - Physical Stability of the worker 37.44% 
 
The probability of occurrence of various hazards is calculated based on the 
characteristic scores along with the relative weightings of factors for each hazard. Figure 
4.11 shows a hierarchical tree diagram with percentages values for each factor under each 
hazard and for each characteristic under each factor. The probability of occurrence of a 











It can be observed from the results that the probabilities of occurrence of the four 
hazards are not high, which is a comforting fact. Hazards 3 and 4 have relatively high 
values of estimated probabilities of occurrences of 0.33 and 0.29 respectively, followed by 
Hazard 1 with 0.21 and finally Hazard 2 with 0.18. The following can be inferred from the 
findings of the HRA approach employed on the mini HDD project in case study #1: 
1. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 1, Hit other utilities, is low mainly due to: 
(a) significant experience of the drill rig operator that made him cautious of this 
hazard, as evidenced by the adjustments made in this case study, and (b) the use of 
appropriate communication systems that reliably relay data on the drill head 
position. These considerations were very much in line with the expected safety 
standards. The significant issue in this case study, however, is the lack of adequate 
sub-surface utility engineering data, especially the depth of the conflicting power 
utility. If the power utility depth was known, the contractor would not have faced 
the issues that he did in drilling above the power line. 
2. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 2 is also found to be very low, mainly due 
to the facts that the used HDD equipment is not very old, the operator is experienced 
and was careful enough to be within the limits of the thrust and torque loads. 
Furthermore, HDD is expected to do well with clayey soils that existed in this case 
study, thereby not making this it a challenging soil cutting job.  
3. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 3, Injury to workers is found to be high 
although the workers are well experienced in HDD projects. This is mainly due to 




such as head protection, both of which are most influential factors as described in 
the chapter 3 for the hazard, Injury to workers.  
4. The probability of occurrence Hazard 4, Workers falling into excavated pits is 
found to be slightly lower than that of Hazard 3. Hazard 4 was aggravated by: (a) 
Lack of barricaders around the creek, (b) unsafe posture of the worker noticed when 
he is tried to reach over and the creek to monitor the drill head position. However, 
knowing the depth of power line burial would have prevented the unsafe behavior 
of crew member B in this case study.   
4.2 Case Study 2: AnMed Health Women's & Children's Hospital, 
Anderson, SC. 
This construction project entails installing a 1” high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
electric service line using horizontal directional drilling (HDD) method. The electric 
service line connects the grid to a lake down the AnMed Health Women's & Children's 
Hospital, Anderson, SC. The average depth of installation is about 10ft. This case study 
analyzes pilot bore and Pull back phase of the HDD project. All the data was recorded in 
person on the day of drilling which was 5th May, 2016.  
Construction Operational Planning 
The contractor chose to use Mini HDD drill rig for this project to install the 1” 
HDPE pipeline through lean clay of low plasticity (i.e., CL type as per USCS 
classification). The contractor employed a two-person crew for this job with one operating 




monitoring the drill path (hereafter referred as crew member B). The weather was 
supportive on the day of drilling with a recorded temperature of 180 C (or ≈ 64.40 F). The 
construction equipment and materials on the project site includes a D 9x13 S3 Navigator 
Horizontal Directional Drill Rig, a fluid tank, drilling fluid, a manually-operated walk over 
system, 1” HDPE pipe spool, and a truck carrying various spare parts. Several of these tools 
are similar to those used in the first case study. The drill rig used in this project has rated 
capacities of 13,000 ft-lb rotational torque and 9,000 lbs. of thrust and pull back forces. 
The fluid mixing tank, which is shown in Figure 4.12, has a capacity of 500 gallons. The 
1” HDPE pipe spool is depicted in Figure 4.13 and the truck carrying various accessories 
and tools is shown in Figure 4.14. The site layout is depicted in Figure 4.15. 
 




















Figure 4.15. Project Site Layout 
Construction Challenges 
There were no unique construction challenges faced on the day of drilling as a brief 
job site survey was conducted prior to start of drilling process and depth of the existing 
utility lines were clearly marked by the respective utility departments, as shown in the 
Figure 4.16. This case study covers pilot-hole drilling phase and pull back phase of the 
project. There were three existing utility lines in the direction of the drill path which were 
marked by the respective utility departments prior to drilling; these include a power line 
(marked in Red, as shown in Figure 4.16), a drinking water line (marked in blue, as shown 






Figure 4.16. Water and Power utility markings on the project site 
 
 





The drilling operation went smoothly in both pilot bore and reaming phases without 
any disturbances. There were also no obstacles and disturbance along the drill path, and 
the risk of “hitting other utilities” was negligible, as there were no existing utilities in the 
planned drill path.  
The position and the orientation of the drill rig were appropriate and didn’t need to 
be changed throughout the drilling process which helped the operation go smoothly. The 
safety on the job site is maintained well enough as per the traffic conditions by arranging 
safety cones as shown in the Figure 4.18. 
 
Figure 4.18. Safety cones arranged to shut the traffic for duration of the work 
Though the site was inspected by the contractor before the day of drilling, some 




exit pit as shown in the Figure 4.19. After the successful completion of the operation, the 
crew member B was working with a compact excavator in between the bushes to fill the 
excavated exit pit to even the ground surface. It seemed to be an unsafe act by crew B as 
the area where the compact excavator is placed is not clear enough to perform such work. 
 






Figure 4.20. A picture showing the crew member B filling the excavated exit pit 
 
The picture shown in the Figure 4.20 relates to the Hazard 3 – Injury to workers (as 
a result of lack of PPE) - which was discussed in Chapter 3 as part of the Hierarchal Risk 
Assessment methodology. In such situations, the crew member could have either used an 
appropriate helmet or simply could have done the job from other safe direction. The 
operational planning could have also been better with safety risks such as this eliminated 
with better work organization and planning. 
Data Collection 
The data necessary for performing the safety risk analysis of this HDD job was 
collected through personal observation and also through a brief interview of the drill rig 
operator who seemed to be superintendent on the jobsite. The collected data is presented 




Table 4.7. Job Site Details 
Parameters Data Input 
Location of the Job site Anderson, SC 
Date 5/5/2016 
Season and weather conditions Spring, 180 C (or ≈ 640 F). 
Work timings 9:45 AM – 11:00 AM  
Length of the Bore hole 455 ft. 
Depth of Installation 10 ft. (average) 
Soil conditions Low plasticity, Lean clay (CL) 
Obstacles along the bore hole - 
Utility lines located in the 
surroundings 
Communications, power and water lines 
Level of accuracy of SUE Level 2  
Number of excavated pits 2 ( Entry pit, Exit pit) 
Traffic around the work site No traffic 
 
Table 4.8. Crew Details 
Parameters Data Input 
Number of workers at Entry pit 1 
Number of workers at Exit pit 1 
Position of the crew Person A at the drill rig, person B monitoring 
the drill head 
 
Table 4.9. Durations 
Parameters Data Input 
Pilot bore phase 09:45 AM to 10:15 AM  
Reaming phase N/A 











Table 4.10. Equipment Details 
Parameters Data Input  
Type and Diameter of the pipe 1” HDPE Pipe 
Amount of fluid used for operation 500 Gallons 
Drill fluid return timings No returns 
Torque 13,000 ft-lb. 
Pull back 9,000 lbs. 
Type of Communication System Radio  
Angle of the drill rig at the entrance 300 
Age of the tools used in the operation 1 Year 
 
Table 4.11. Safety Details 
Parameters Data Input 
PPE of the Labor Leather clothing, Safety vest, Shoes, Hat 
Type of barricading around the job site Safety Cones  
Unsafe behavior and posters of the 
workers 
One ( working under the trees to clear the 
ground surface ) 
Safety Regulations followed by the crew OSHA  
Color of clothing N/A 
Material of the Clothing Leather Jackets  





Based on the data collected for the pilot-hole and Pull-back phases of this mini 
HDD project, probabilities of occurrence of various hazards are estimated using the 
Hierarchical Safety Risk Assessment (HRA) approach that was described in Chapter 3. 
Characteristics are chosen for each factor based on the data from Tables 4.7 through 4.11 
and presented in Table 4.12. The relative percentage preferences of the characteristics in 
terms of their safety attributes, which are derived from a survey of HDD contractors, are 




Table 4.12. Characteristics and Corresponding Percentage Scores for each Factor 
Factor Characteristic Weightage  
F1 - Experience of the 
operator performing the 
boring operation 
C4  -  More than 10 Years 16.36% 
F2  - Accuracy of SUE C3 - Quality level B (per ASCE 38-02): 
Information obtained by application of 
surface geophysical methods to 
determine the existence and approximate 




F3 - Failure in 
Communication mechanism 
C2 - Good quality walk over system 
operated by the skilled labor 
21.52% 
F4 - Age of the tools used for 
the operation 
C1 – Less than 3 years 13.70% 
F5  -  Increased Torque/drag/ 
Rotational Speed of the drill 
rig 
C1 - Experience of the operator 
performing the boring operation in 
maintaining the limits of buffer capacity 
of the drill rig 
25.54% 
F6  - Lack of PPE C1 –  Unsuitable material / Color of the 
clothing 
43.30% 
F7 - Unsuitable apparel for 
the work conditions 
C1 – Improper clothing/PPE of the 
worker  
52.38% 
F8 - Lack of Proper 
barricading around the 
excavated pits 
  
F9 – Behavior and Posture of 
the workers 




The probability of occurrence of various hazards is estimated based on the 
characteristic scores along with the relative weightings of factors for each hazard. Figure 
4.21 shows a hierarchy tree diagram with percentages values for each factor under each 
hazard and for each characteristic under each factor. Probability of occurrence any hazard 















As can be observed from Figure 4.21, the probabilities of occurrence of various hazards 
are not significantly high with the maximum value being 0.33. Some inferences based on 
these findings: 
1. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 1, Hit other utilities, is 0.20 in this case 
study. This low value is mainly due to: (a) Accuracy of the SUE marking, (b) the 
use of appropriate communication systems that reliably relay data on the drill head 
position. These considerations were very much in line with the expected safety 
standards. There were no significant construction challenges as the drill path was 
carefully planned before the start of actual drilling.  
2. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 2, Stall/ Breakage of the drill string/drill 
head is significantly low with a value of 0.18. The reason behind this is: (a) use of 
drill tools with good age criteria, (b) significant experience of the drill rig operator 
that made the operation go successfully in estimated time. However, proper 
planning of the drilling activity in each phase has also helped the crew to perform 
the job without facing surprising challenges. 
3. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 3, Injury to workers is relatively high at 
0.33 and it is mainly aggravated by: (a) the unsafe behavior exhibited by the worker 
B at the end of the operation while leveling the ground surface using a back-hoe, 
and (b) due to lack of suitable PPE for performing such an activity. 
4. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 4, Workers falling into excavated pits has 




cones along the length of the obstacles and excavated pits to avoid general public 





















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Safety is of primary importance in any construction operation. Safe working 
environment promotes the wellbeing of the crew, decreases equipment and infrastructure 
damage and its associated costs. Although HDD construction method has helped with 
urban infrastructure development, there is still a need to evaluate the practices in the 
context of safety risk to workers, infrastructure and HDD equipment. To address this 
limitation this study proposed and demonstrated the Hierarchical Risk Assessment 
methodology using two HDD projects happened in the State of South Carolina. This 
research has made a good attempt to evaluate the risk of HDD projects. Extended research 
in this area in the near future will help in mitigating the safety risk further more. 
The hierarchical risk assessment methodology entails the identification of specific 
hazards, factors that influence the hazards and the project characteristics that aggravate the 
safety risk characterized through the hazards and the influential factors. Four hazards, nine 
factors and several project characteristics have been identified in this study to investigate 
the safety risk of HDD projects; a review of case studies of accidents on past HDD projects 
informed the selection of the hazards and factors in this study. Experts are surveyed to 
quantify the influence of factors on the hazards and the characteristics on the factors using 
the basic principles of analytical hierarchy process.  
The hierarchical risk assessment methodology has been demonstrated on two mini 
HDD projects which entailed installing small diameter pipelines in residential 




Assessment” (HRA) Methodology in assessing the probabilities of occurrence of various 
hazards on HDD projects. Furthermore, the evaluation process is easy and less time 
consuming after required data inputs are obtained. Knowing the safety risk value, necessary 
care can be taken to mitigate the hazards.  
5.1 Limitations of the study: 
1. A major limitation of this study is that the HRA methodology uses expert opinions alone 
for determining the percentage influence values for factors influencing hazards and 
characteristics influencing factors. And these opinions are subjective and lack evidence. 
2. Another limitation is that responses from only five experts have been used to tabulate 
the priority vectors that were later used in assessing the probabilities of occurrence of HDD 
hazards. Basing the methodology on only five experts’ opinion may have not produced a 
very reliable priority vectors. 
3. The lack of consideration of other hazards that may be significant is another limitation. 
The four hazards considered in this study are based on a brief review of the past HDD 
accident histories and not many accidents are well reported with all the factors leading to 
them clearly identified. Similarly, the factors used in this study may very well not be a 
exhaustive list.  
4. The demonstration of the methodology is also limited in terms of the size of the HDD 
projects. The two case studies presented in this study are very small diameter (≤2 inches 
diameter) service line installations, and more informative findings would have been 




large diameter pipelines. The methodology would also be more useful for large diameter 
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Questionnaire: Comparative Questionnaire Survey for factors influencing hazards. 
1) Relative to the factor “Accuracy of Sub surface utility Engineering (SUE),” how
significantly will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute to the






2) Relative to the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the
crew,” how significantly will the factor “Accuracy of Sub surface utility Engineering






3) Relative to the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the
crew,” how significantly will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute







4) Relative to the factor “Age of the tools used for the HDD operation,” how significantly
will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute to the occurrence of






5) Relative to the factor “Exceeding the force limits of the drill rig,” how significantly will
the factor “Age of the tools used for the HDD operation” contribute to the occurrence of






6) Relative to the factor “Exceeding the force limits of the drill rig,” how significantly will
the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute to the occurrence of







7) Relative to the factor “Lack of PPE,” how significantly will the factor “Experience of






8) Relative to the factor “Experience of the worker on job site,” how significantly will the






9) Relative to the factor “Unsuitable apparel for the work conditions,” how significantly
will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute to the occurrence of







10) Relative to the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the
crew,” how significantly likely will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site”






11) Relative to the factor “Lack of proper barricading around the pits and alarms,” how
significantly will the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the






12) Relative to the factor “Behavior and postures of the workers during the drilling
operation,” how significantly will the factor “Lack of proper barricading around the pits







13) Relative to the factor “Behavior and postures of the workers during the drilling
operation,” how significantly likely will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site”






14) Relative to the factor “Behavior and postures of the workers during the drilling
operation,” how significantly will the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication








15) Relative to the factor “Experience of the worker on the job site,” how significantly will
the factor “Lack of proper barricading around the pits and alarms” contribute to the
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Comparative Questionnaire Survey results for factors influencing hazards and characteristics influencing factors. 
Table B.1. Comparative questionnaire survey results converted to quantitative numbers for factors influencing hazards H1, H2,
H3 and H4. 
Hazard One (H1) Hazard Two (H2) Hazard Three (H3) Hazard Four (H4) 
F12 F23 F13 F14 F45 F15 F16 F67 F17 F13 F38 F89 F19 F18 F39
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 
E1 1 0.5 3 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 
E2 0.5 0.33 3 0.5 0.5 2 3 1 3 3 2 0.33 3 0.5 0.33 
E3 1 3 0.33 2 0.33 2 0.5 2 0.5 3 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 0.33 
E4 0.5 3 3 0.5 2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
E5 0.3 2 2 0.5 0.5 0.33 3 3 2 0.5 0.5 0.33 1 0.3 3 
∑(E1:E5) 3.3 8.83 11.3 3.83 3.83 5.16 7.33 7.33 6.83 7.33 3.83 2.49 5.83 1.96 2.29 
Avg.(E1:E5) 0.66 1.76 2.26 0.76 0.76 1.03 1.46 1.46 1.36 1.46 0.76 0.49 1.16 0.39 0.45 
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Table B.2. Comparative questionnaire survey results converted to quantitative numbers for characteristics influencing factors 
F1, F2 and F3. 
 F1 F2 F3 
C12 C23 C34 C14 C13 C24 C12 C23 C34 C14 C13 C24 C12 C23 C34 C14 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 
E1 2 2 3 0.33 3 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2 2 0.33 3 
E2 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.33 0.33 0.33 
E3 2 0.5 0.33 2 0.5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.5 2 
E4 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.33 2 
E5 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.33 0.33 0.5 
∑(E1:E5) 8.5 6.83 7.66 6.66 7.83 6.66 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 6.66 1.82 7.83 
Avg.(E1:E5) 1.7 1.36 1.53 0.33 1.56 1.33 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.7 1.33 0.36 1.56 
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Table B.3. Comparative questionnaire survey results for characteristics influencing factors F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8 and F9. 
F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
C13 C24 C12 C23 C34 C14 C13 C24 C12 C23 C13 C12 C12 C12 C12 C23 C13 
Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 Q31 Q32 Q33 
E1 0.33 0.5 2 2 3 0.33 3 0.33 2 3 0.5 3 2 0.33 1 1 0.33 
E2 2 2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 3 2 2 0.33 0 0.33 1 0.33 0.5 
E3 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.5 2 0.5 0 1 2 1 0.5 0.5 
E4 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.5 2 0.33 0.33 1 0.5 2 2 0 2 2 0.5 2 0.5 
E5 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33. 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2 0.33 2 
∑(E1:E5) 3.32 3.49 3.32 3.49 5.99 1.65 4.32 2.49 6.5 9.33 5.5 3.83 5.5 5.16 5.5 4.16 3.83 
Avg.(E1:E5) 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.69 1.98 0.33 0.86 0.49 1.3 0.86 1.1 0.76 1.1 1.03 1.1 0.83 0.76 
